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Abstract As wildlife trafficking or the illegal wildlife trade has taken a more prominent place
on the global agenda, discussions are taking place as to how wildlife trafficking happens. An
increased understanding has revealed that corruption is a key facilitator of this profitable and
pervasive global black market, but limited research has explored exactly what that corruption
looks like and how corruption enables wildlife to be trafficked. Furthermore, research shows
that Asia, particularly China and Southeast Asia, are focal points for the supply and demand of
certain species of wildlife. Through a literature-based investigation, this paper unpacks the role
specific acts of corruption play in the trafficking of ivory, reptile skins and live reptiles from,
through or to Asia. It is proposed that not only do individual corrupt acts enable wildlife
trafficking to happen, but also that corrupted structures (the criminal justice system, and
economic and political foundations) in some societies enable trafficking to happen and also
increase the resilience of trafficking to reduction measures. In collating detailed data about the
forms of corruption facilitating wildlife trafficking, the gaps in knowledge, and therefore the
important areas for further research, become evident.
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Introduction
As wildlife trafficking or the illegal wildlife trade has taken a more prominent place on the
global agenda, discussions are taking place as to how wildlife trafficking happens. Certainly,
there are theoretical explanations for the demand driving wildlife trafficking (TRAFFIC 2008;
Wyatt 2013b), but corruption has emerged as a clear facilitator of the illegal trade in wildlife
(WWF and TRAFFIC 2015; Wyatt and Cao 2015; UNODC 2016). Corruption is a complex
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concept that does not have a universal definition. In drawing on the range of literature
regarding corruption,1 we considered corruption to consist of any person (public official or
private individual) who abuses their position to benefit themselves, people in their network,
their community or their organisation. In conducting our literature-based study, we looked for
documentation of corrupt acts fitting this definition throughout the current academic,
governmental and non-governmental publications available through our University’s
library database and online. The corrupt acts fall within the broad categories of bribery,
patronage, diplomatic cover and permit abuse (Wyatt and Cao 2015). Bribery is the
offering of money or gifts in exchange for the person being bribed undertaking one of
the acts listed (turning a blind eye, providing information, allowing smuggling and so
forth). Patronage also results in turning a blind eye etc., but the actors are connected
through a family or friendship network. For instance, rhinoceros ranch owners and
veterinarians colluding with poachers and then sharing in the profit of the horn sale
(Duffy 2014). Diplomatic cover is the use of an official diplomatic position to engage in
trafficking that is difficult to uncover and to stop because of the protected status of these
positions. Finally, permit abuse occurs in numerous forms involving fraud, forgery and
theft (Wyatt and Cao 2015). As stated above in regard to the definition of corruption, the
corrupt actors are from both the public and private sectors (Table 1). They abuse their
position to benefit themselves, those close to them or their organisation.
Asia, particularly China and the Southeast, is cited as being key area for both the
sourcing and the consumption of illegal wildlife (TRAFFIC 2008; UNODC 2016). As this
paper will demonstrate using three case studies of ivory, reptile skins and live reptiles,
corruption takes place in every stage of the wildlife trafficking process. These three
wildlifes were chosen as they cover some of the range of wildlife market diversity in
terms of their form (wildlife part (ivory); processed wildlife product (reptile skins); and
live wildlife (live reptiles)), the reason they are in demand (luxury products and pets) and
their legal status (it is illegal to trade ivory internationally; reptile skins and live reptiles
are legal to trade subject to conditions). With this diversity, we predict that different forms
of individual corrupt acts will facilitate the different black markets. Drawing on the
research of WWF/TRAFFIC (2015), Wyatt and Cao (2015) and Williams et al. (2016),
we propose that the wildlife trafficking process consists of planning, poaching/breeding,
distribution, transportation, processing, selling and laundering (see Table 3 which provides
a full summary). Not each of these steps will be relevant to every species or market of
wildlife, but most wildlife will be subjected to these processes beginning with their death
or capture through to being sold.
Importantly though, and one of the biggest challenges for preventing wildlife
trafficking, is that often the wildlife trafficking process sits within already corrupt
structures that facilitate crime of all kinds. We propose that the criminal justice system,
the political environment and the economic environment are the overarching structures
that may be corrupted which in turn facilitate trafficking of wildlife and other contraband.
It is important to note that these structures, and thus wildlife trafficking, have further social
and cultural contexts that also play a role in how prevalent corruption may or may not be.
Holmes (2006) notes in the case of many Eastern European countries that corruption is
prevalent and expected, but the public when surveyed still perceive the corruption to be
1 For a comprehensive discussion of definitions of corruption see Klitgaard (1988), Passas (1998), Doig and
Theobold (2003) or Holmes (2006) amongst others.
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wrong. Whereas we agree that this is a significant element to the connection between
corruption and wildlife trafficking, a full discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of
our paper. We do therefore explore all corrupt acts matching our definition even when
these may be viewed as Bnormal^ in the context where the acts are occurring. This article
will first analyse the structures we have proposed in which wildlife trafficking takes place
before detailing each of the case studies in terms of the specific acts of corruption that are
known to be occurring at each of the stages of the process.
Corrupt Structures
In Table 2, we outline the three structures of society that corrupt or corruptible may
provide the basis on which wildlife trafficking can occur. As the table illustrates, these
three structures occur in parallel and cover the whole of the society in which wildlife
trafficking takes place. The first is the criminal justice system. In the case studies, we will
explore instances of individual law enforcement corruption that enable wildlife trafficking.
Here, we are investigating the wider criminal justice system and how, if corrupted, this
impacts upon wildlife trafficking. Individual law enforcement officers if corrupted may
facilitate the trafficking of wildlife from poaching through to selling. Other employees of
the criminal justice system may also play a role. Prosecutors and judges may also be
corrupt. In the case of prosecutors being corrupt, this may lead to, in the rare instances
where wildlife traffickers are arrested and brought to court, acquittals and/or lenient
sentences. Instances of wildlife traffickers being arrested and/or processed by the criminal
justice system are rare because of the near global phenomena that environmental and
Table 1 The corrupt actors and acts in wildlife trafficking
Corrupt actors
Private sector Transportation employees, veterinarians, wildlife-related businesses and
industries
Public sector Border guards, customs agents, forest officers, game rangers, judiciary,
legislators, park rangers, police, politicians, prosecutors, regulators
Corrupt acts
Bribes Patronage Diplomatic
cover
Permit abuse
• Allow access to wildlife
• Draft weak legislation
• Fraudulent permits
• Gift giving to individuals
and groups
• Interfere with normal operations
• Leak intelligence (patrols, raids)
• Lenient sentences
• Mishandle evidence
• Not conduct investigations
• Not stop poaching
• Re-direct patrols
• Smuggle
• Steal confiscated wildlife
• Turn a blind eye
• Allow access to wildlife
• Draft weak legislation
• Fraudulent permits
• Gift giving to individuals
and groups
• Interfere with normal operations
• Leak intelligence (patrols, raids)
• Lenient sentences
• Mishandle evidence
• Not conduct investigations
• Not stop poaching
• Re-direct patrols
• Smuggle
• Steal confiscated wildlife
• Turn a blind eye
• Smuggle • Misdeclare volumes
and values
• Misidentify species
• Mislabel captive bred
for wild caught
• Recycle legal permits
• Sell export, import
and/or hunting permits
• Steal permits and CITES
documentation
Adapted from Wyatt and Cao (2015)
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wildlife crimes are not priorities for law enforcement or criminal justice (Wyatt 2013b;
DLA Piper 2014). This leads to a noticeable absence of wildlife criminals being held
accountable (Hall and Wyatt 2017).
One of the key issues with corruption within the legislative process is that of discretion
within the judiciary. Despite legislation being in place to prevent wildlife trafficking and to
prosecute those who commit this crime, it is up to the discretion of the judge to decide on these
cases. Additionally, evidence in wildlife trafficking cases may go missing so the cases cannot
go forward (Master 2015). For example, an investigation by DLA Piper (2015): 483)
highlighted that on several occasions, prosecutions have been either stalled due to evidence
tampering or Bdisappear[ed] from the judicial process once the suspect is granted bail^. These
are examples after the trafficking has taken place. Also, evident are societies where the
legislation itself—the foundation for preventing wildlife trafficking—is weak because of a
corrupted legislature that manipulate or maintain legislation that does not address wildlife
trafficking and/or corruption.
The Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) and the members of CITES are required to adopt national domestic
legislation, to be compliant with the convention, including banning or limiting trade of
species listed in one of its three appendices. CITES (2015a) officials acknowledged that
there needs to be legislation that links anti-corruption work with that of wildlife trafficking
and organised crime as they are not separate entities. The link between corruption,
organised crime and wildlife trafficking is important in terms of legislation as it is Bcrucial
to ensure that combating corruption as it affects trade in wildlife and CITES implemen-
tation is built into other relevant conventions, national laws, institutions and programmes^
(CITES 2015a). At the Conference of the Parties meeting of CITES members in 2016,
CITES went even further in its call to action against corruption by passing the Draft
Resolution BProhibiting, Preventing, Detecting and Countering Corruption Facilitating
Activities Conducted in Violation of the Convention^ (CITES 2016b). The resolution
amongst other guidance notes that 15 of the, at the time, 182 convention signatories are not
members of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and that all signa-
tories to UNCAC are required to Bcriminalise bribery and a number of related offences^
(CITES 2016b: 4).
Table 2 Corrupt aspects and corruptible structures of society that facilitate wildlife trafficking
Criminal justice system Economics Politics
• Judicial corruption—no penalties
for IWT
• Law enforcement colluding with
organised crime and traffickers—
stealing evidence and seizures
• Police/rangers not keeping records
of poaching and IWT
• Law enforcement is prone to
corruption because they have
no training, supervision or
ethical guidance
• Corruption and bribe taking
are normative
• Weak ports
• Weak financial institutions
• Weak legislation and enforcement
around money laundering and
tax evasion
• Misappropriation, fraud and/or
embezzlement of wildlife
programme funds
• Politicians colluding with
traffickers and organised crime
• No political will
• Politicians protect traffickers
• Corruption and bribe taking are
normative
• Politicians taking bribes to
make/keep weak legislation;
to make legislation ambiguous
with loopholes
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Yet there are instances where the political element of societies that provide the basis for
legislation is inadequate or not functioning to support the rule of law, i.e. weak governance.
The report by DLA Piper (2014) found that national primary legislation was very mixed. It was
identified that part of the problem with legislation was that wildlife crime was not always seen
as a serious crime, and the report stated that Ba law will act as a deterrent only where the
penalties for violating that law are proportionate to the prohibited activity^ (DLA Piper 2014:
2). This is true of wildlife trafficking and corruption. Where there is weak governance
generally then, there is the likelihood that this system will be corruptible.
Similarly, a report from the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (Martini 2013) examined
the ways in which wildlife trafficking legislation impacts on poaching and other aspects of the
illegal wildlife trade. One of the difficulties with weak regulatory frameworks is that many of
the corrupted individuals throughout the process are government actors, for example, officials
implementing CITES, government authority figures, public officials and actors within the
police and criminal justice system (Martini 2013). These can be considered under so-called
petty corruption, where the individual benefits are on a small scale. Yet, there are also instances
of grand corruption, where the benefits of the corruption are significant in terms of the bribes
being received or because the corrupt official maintains a system from which they receive large
benefits (Doig and Theobald 2003). Because of this, it is often a complicated web of bribery
and corruption that can be difficult to unravel. Corrupt officials with the power to change or
implement wildlife legislation can cause legislation to combat wildlife trafficking to be weak
and ineffective as this suits the needs of those (possibly themselves) who wish to benefit
financially from this illicit trade. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre found that some
public officials maintain a personal or financial interest in the wildlife trade, and therefore
could be able to influence decisions, particularly in regard to legislation, through bribery,
exotic illicit gifts such as ivory (Martini 2013) or from direct personal gain from the
unchallenged illegal trade.
Whereas corruption can be found in relation to national legislative structures regarding
wildlife trafficking, it is also a transnational issue not only because of the movement of wildlife
across borders but also because of the transfer of money between countries and to different
actors. BCorruption and weak regulatory frameworks may offer several opportunities to
criminal organisations to launder the proceeds of crime^ (Martini 2013:1). With regard to
wildlife, this most likely takes place in those markets where there are legal and illegal parallel
markets. For instance, as we will discuss in the case studies below, it is feasible that illegally
obtained ivory or illegally caught reptiles are laundered into the legitimate industry by corrupt
employees and organisations in order to maximise profits.
In summary, wildlife trafficking occurs within three structural elements of society within
which corruption is also prevalent. The wider criminal justice system, not just rangers and law
enforcement directly involved with detecting trafficking, may take bribes to acquit traffickers
or give lenient sentences. In some places, politicians can directly benefit from the illegal
wildlife trade so work to maintain weak wildlife protection legislation or impede and disrupt
efforts to improve this legislation. It may not only be wildlife protection legislation that is
made weak, it may be too that financial or civil legislation to combat money laundering and
corruption is impeded. Individual corrupt acts, as will shortly be detailed in the three case
studies, are then at times taking place within criminal justice systems and political and
economic structures that are compromised and maintained by corrupt officials (see Table 2).
With both macro- and micro-levels of corruption at work, tackling wildlife trafficking is a
difficult challenge.
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The Case Studies Involving Asia
Ivory
Recent increases in elephant poaching have made Bcorruption a high profile issue^ (Smith
et al. 2014: 954), since park staff, enforcement officers and politicians have all been implicated
(Gross 2007; Weru 2016). Additionally, it has previously been argued that CITES’ index of the
BProportion of Illegally Killed Elephants^ (PIKE) documenting countries that have high
elephant poaching rates corresponds with countries that also have low Corruption Perception
Index (CPI) as calculated by Transparency International scores (Williams and Parry-Jones
2016). Created in 1995, the CPI scores, rated from 100 (very clean) to 0 (very corrupt),
determine the extent of corruption in 176 countries’ public sector around the world
(Transparency International 2017). Furthermore, the EIA (2016: 8) noted that out of the 15
Illegal Wildlife Trade countries, 12 (80%) Bhad a score of less than 50, indicating high levels
of corruption^. This case study provides evidence to support that within the ivory trade
corruption is present at many of the different trade stages.
The sophisticated criminal networks that are involved with the ivory trade, which frequently
span across many international borders, often consist of poachers, mainland smugglers, cross
sea smugglers, end market traders and corrupt officials (EIA 2014). Bennett (2014: 56) argues
that there are many different governmental Bofficials demanding bribes for compliance… and
accepting bribes to overlook illegal activities^. Furthermore, customs officials have been
known to switch documents, identification cards and other permits allowing the ivory to pass
further along the chain without being noticed as illegal; there are also reports of officials
falsifying certificates at the processing or end sale point to allow entry into the legal market
(Bennett 2014; DLA Piper 2015; EIA 2014).
Corruption within the ivory trade causes many problems. For example, bribery not only
disrupts plans to combat illegal trade, it also hinders the Benforcement of anti-poaching laws,
sustainable hunting, and effective land-use planning^ (Smith et al. 2014: 954). Embezzlement
not only reduces conservation funding levels but also weakens positive incentive for commu-
nity-based conservation. This is because many of the protected areas in Africa do not
contribute to regional poverty reduction (Duffy and St John 2013). Furthermore, decision
makers may focus more upon the wishes of donors and elites instead of for the benefit of
the conservation programme. BFraud also diverts and reduces conservation funding and
undermines donor confidence by claiming funds for non-existent projects or colluding to
avoid paying concession fees^ (Smith et al. 2014: 954). Furthermore, cronyism and
nepotism reduces ranger staff morale as well as the possibility of illegal activities being
reported (Smith et al. 2014). Legal loopholes along the trade chain (Weru 2016) and Bone-
off^ sales of ivory stockpiles (Gossmann 2009) are argued by some as being one of the
main driving forces behind the demand for ivory which ultimately intensifies poaching for
and smuggling of ivory (Bennett 2014; EIA 2014; Gossmann 2009). For example, in
Chad, the poaching of elephants increased dramatically because of the increasing
Bacceptability of and access to the global ivory trade^ (Gossmann 2009: 55). Yet, CITES
argue that the Blink between the two one-off legal ivory sales and increasing illegal killing
of elephant has not been established by the data presently available^, and other Bdrivers
are involved in the ongoing illegal ivory trade^ (Martin et al. 2012: vi). We will now draw
on the existing literature to provide examples of corrupt activities at each stages of the
trafficking process.
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Poaching
Poaching is often associated with states that exhibit Blow levels of law enforcement and high
levels of corruption, conflict, political instability, and access to small arms^ (Gossmann
2009:58) which also correlates with low CPI scores (Atuobi 2007; DLA Piper 2015; Williams
and Parry-Jones 2016). In Uganda, Bthe demand for and payment of bribes are no longer
secret… corruption is becoming an acceptable way of life^ (Moreto et al. 2015: 362). It was
found that having either relatives or friends who have previously poached influences a ranger’s
decision in allowing misconduct related to poaching to happen (Moreto et al. 2015). Moreto
et al.’s (2015) findings were not specific to just ivory, yet at this point, they cannot be
generalised to other protected areas other than the one in their study or to outside of Uganda.
Nevertheless, there has been evidence of similar low levels of corruption within the ivory trade
elsewhere around the globe. For example, in Kenya, the involvement of rangers in poaching
was evident by the Ministry for Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) firing B21 game
rangers for collaborating with poachers^ (EIA 2014: 11). In some instances, outside poachers
have been hired in by government officials or local fixers. For example, in 2014, police
officials fromMloka (a main entry point for the Selous Game Reserve) hired outside poachers,
supplied them with weapons and took delivery of the ivory (EIA 2014).
In the cases of ranger misconduct, for example, the theft of confiscated ivory to sell on
illegally (Moreto et al. 2015) or Baccepting bribes to help or turn a blind eye to poachers^
(Somerville 2016), there are many factors from personal factors to structural or organisational
factors that can contribute to that misconduct. Personal factors, for example, range from family
traditions of individual rangers to poor decision making (Moreto et al. 2015). In regard to the
latter, lack of education, for instance, may hinder rangers’ Bability to exercise appropriate
conduct when tempted to engage in wrongdoing^ (Moreto et al. 2015: 371). Nevertheless,
when it came to the main reasoning behind ranger misconduct, it was found that Beconomic
motivations^ were an influential factor (Duffy 2014: 830), with rangers being referred to as
Bmoney hungry^ (EIA 2014; Moreto et al. 2015: 372). However, economic motivations are
not always the case in ranger misconduct, which are discussed further below.
Organisational and structural factors that affects ranger misconduct can be from low wages
where Bbribe money would be used to pay for school fees for rangers’ children, [and] other
family bills^ (Moreto et al. 2015: 373), to inadequate supervision, limited equipment and
incomplete training. Most rangers do not have the right training to know what they are looking
for, the right equipment to stop poachers or do not have the right supervision to oversee their
behaviour and actions (Moreto et al. 2015). In conservation areas and wildlife parks, issues of
funding also slow the ability of rangers in stopping poachers as this lack of funds leads to a
lack of equipment, lack of staff wages and ultimately lack of morale, which are argued to be
detrimental for conservation practices (Bennett 2014; EIA 2014).
The distance between ranger outposts and headquarters can also be a significant factor for
misconduct. Moreto et al. (2015) argue that the closer the ranger is stationed to headquarters
the less likely they are to do anything for fear of being caught by a superior, whereas those who
are stationed in the far outposts are more likely to become poachers themselves. It has also
been noted that rangers travel in groups, so to keep the misconduct unnoticed there needs to be
a high level of compliance and secrecy between the rangers stationed together. This coupled
with low wages further widens the group’s susceptibility to bribery (Moreto et al. 2015).
Lastly, socio-cultural factors can also impact upon ranger misconduct. Corruption amongst
other government officials, including the police, contributes somewhat to a normative context
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where illegal behaviour and wrongdoing is accepted, Bif not expected^ due to family ties and
traditions (Moreto et al. 2015: 375). This was evident in Uganda when an ivory investigation
was hindered by police corruption. Finally, there are also fears of corrupt practices occurring
within the local community-by-community leaders, embezzling money from the illicit prac-
tices as witnessed during the 1970s and 1980s in West and South Africa (Duffy 2014). For
example, in the Kumleben Commission, it was exposed that the South African Defence Force
(SADF), during the apartheid era, were involved in poaching and trafficking of ivory to Bfund
its wars and destabilisation campaigns in South West Africa (now Namibia)^ (Duffy 2014:
830). Further to that, it has also been argued that communities located around elephant habitats
can have little motive to protect elephants, with locals, often being Bbought off by poachers to
provide information or help in killing elephants^ (Downey 2016).
Transportation
The transporting of illegal ivory also draws attention to the corrupt practices by those in places
of authority. For example, along the Vietnam-China border, there is an estimated
$18,000–$30,000 a day given out in bribes to border officials to allow illegal ivory to cross
borders (Bennett 2014). In Tanzania, six Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA) officers were
arrested for their involvement in allowing containers filled with ivory to be sealed and then
exported out of Tanzania (EIA 2014). This emphasises the notion that B[t]raffickers are
attracted to ports where controls are weak or where officials can be bribed^ (EIA 2014: 10).
Further to that, the EIA (2014): 21) found that there have been incidents involving Bnaval
officers and personnel^ from both China and Tanzania accepting bribes for shipments of ivory
to be transported across borders without inspection. These examples support that the planning
phase of the trafficking process also includes corruption as places or people that can be
targeted for bribery are the main routes for smuggling.
Illegal ivory has been found hidden amongst plastic waste, timber and agricultural products
where a network of Bfreight forwarders and shipping agents ensure all of the paperwork is
completed and customs officials are paid off^ (EIA 2014: 17). Zanzibar used to be the
Bpreferred exit point for ivory smuggling syndicates^ (EIA 2014: 23). Now, the Kilindini Port
in Mombasa and Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi are becoming the top exit
points for the trafficking of wildlife, which highlights that the transportation route of poached
ivory is forever changing due the expanding transportation networks in countries like Kenya
(Weru 2016). It was argued that Bsince 2009, more ivory has exited through Mombasa than
any other trade route out of Africa^, destined primarily for Asia, Bwith transit points in
Malaysia, Viet Nam, Thailand and Singapore^ (Weru 2016: x). More information about
transportation routes is now possible because of the advancements in forensic research. For
instance, Wasser et al. (2015) have perfected DNA-based technology that identifies the country
or locations of origin of ivory that has been seized. Their research indicates that seizures made
in various countries in Asia originated from a range of countries in Central Africa.
Ivory smugglers to obscure the true origin of the shipment use many transit countries in the
Middle East, and South and East Asia. They take advantage of the amount of cargo coming in
and out of ports, especially in places like Hong Kong Bwhere the sheer volume of trade and the
imperative to clear freight quickly means that a small fraction of containers is subject to
inspection^ (EIA 2014: 26). Also, places such as Mong Cai, Vietnam are also Bdominated by
organised criminal gangs, aided by corrupt customs and border control officers who charge a
fee to wave cargo through unofficial crossings^ (EIA 2014: 27). Furthermore, Weru (2016: 16)
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noted that with products such as elephant ivory and rhino horn Bwildlife traffickers are able to
exploit security loopholes in the country’s law enforcement network^. Therefore, lax controls
and the willingness of officials to take bribes make the smuggling of ivory possible.
Selling
In addition to taking part in the poaching stage of ivory trafficking, either by poaching
themselves or by taking bribes to allow poaching to occur, park rangers have been known to
steal elephant tusks that are locked away in the evidence room to make extra money (Moreto
et al. 2015). Also, in relation to the selling stage, raw ivory, illegally poached, is regularly sold
to wholesalers and craftsmen in unregulated markets and is most often Bshipped overseas
before being carved into a variety of items^ (Lemieux and Clarke 2009: 453). Unregulated
markets, facilitated by corruption and civil war, provide an Boutlet to sell ivory without
international oversight^ (Lemieux and Clarke 2009: 454). Registration certificates have
become priceless articles of exchange in the ivory trade; vendors have been found selling
identification certificates and licences to unlicensed dealers for extortionate prices (Martin and
Vigne 2011). Ivory is transported and/or sold on within Africa from the poaching locations
towards to the shipping ports (EIA 2015). Ivory is also possibly sold on within Asia after it
arrives rather than only being directly imported to the final country of destination. For instance,
Nijman and Shepherd (2014) found a lucrative ivory market in Mong La, Myanmar. In an area
with no law enforcement and lack of control from the central government, a space exists for
ivory to be traded and enter into China with no repercussions (Nijman and Shepherd 2014).
Summary
There is then substantial evidence indicating that corruption facilitates the illegal ivory trade in
relation to planning, poaching, transportation and selling. Whilst there is no direct evidence
currently in the literature that documents corruption in the processing and laundering stages,
our prediction is that further research would produce proof that corruption features in these
stages as well. Furthermore, the evidence above highlights the need for more to be done
transnationally to improve law enforcement capabilities at all stages of the market. For
instance, new approaches to border control like random inspections might be tried to combat
both trafficking and corruption. It has been noted though that random inspections are a
hindrance rather than a regulatory tool in stopping the trade. This is because increasing the
amount of enforcement often leads to an increase in the number of bribes being handed over
(Bennett 2014). Additionally, if judiciary powers are also weak, then even the strongest
Bregulations do little to enhance good management^ instead, it just provides further opportu-
nities for corruption (Bennett 2014: 56). Improved law enforcement and anti-corruption
measures then need to be coordinated efforts. More evidence of corruption in wildlife
trafficking and the need for synergistic approaches are also evident in the illegal trade of
reptile skins.
Reptile (Snake) Skins
Leather made from reptile skin maybe a small portion of the overall global leather industry, but
it is a growing and lucrative market (IUCN 2014). According to the Responsible Ecosystems
Sourcing Platform (RESP 2015), over two million reptile skins are traded annually. The leather
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is sourced from more than 25 species of crocodiles, lizards and snakes all listed in one of the
CITES appendices. The value of these two million reptile skins is estimated to be around $6
billion. There are 25 producing countries and ten transit countries many of which are located
within Asia (RESP 2015). In particular, two large python species found in Asia—the Retic-
ulated Python (Python reticulatus) and the Burmese Python (Python molurus bivittatus)—are
popular in the industry and have been for nearly 80 years (IUCN 2014). Historically, pythons
have been taken from the wild to meet the demand of the leather industry, but in recent years,
there has been a shift towards captive breeding. According to the IUCN (2014), there is a
growing demand for python skins in the global fashion industry with almost a half million
python skins of these two species being exported from Asian countries each year for the last
10 years. Our discussion below will tend to focus on snake skins in particular though, as
mentioned, other species of reptiles are used for leather.
Poaching and Breeding
The trade in most snake skins is governed under CITES. Trade is allowed providing the skins
are accompanied by declarations of their origins, including those captured from the wild,
captive bred, confiscated or seized or pre-CITES (CIVIC 2013; UNCTAD/CITES 2013).
Captive breeding programmes, ranching and wild harvesting are the dominant forms of
production. Legal gathering of reptiles and snakes for their by-products is controlled by
licences and permits (WWF/TRAFFIC 2015; UNODC 2016)—a system which lends itself
to corruption through document fraud (misdeclaring species, number, volume or origin on
legitimate paperwork). Licences and permits can also be forged (fake documentation made to
look like it is legitimate). Fraud and, potentially to a lesser degree, forgery are corrupt
practices, because, as above, they are possible because of the perpetrator’s legitimate occupa-
tion and abuse of their position. Such abuse of licences and permits allows for the collection or
rearing of a greater number of reptiles, thus exceeding annual quotas, and in turn allowing
actors involved in this stage of the trade to earn greater profits. This also enables stockpiling of
skins, which may be laundered at later stages in the trade. A 2016 case study of the Vietnamese
python skin trade found that skins were produced almost entirely through captive breeding
programmes (Nossal et al. 2016a). However, wild harvesting of reptiles was not uncommon,
and suppliers could not guarantee that small quantities of wild-caught skins were not entering
the Vietnamese supply chain. Advances in research of isotopic and elemental markers may
help to address questions related to origin and source. Natusch et al. (2017) undertook a study
of python skins from Indonesia and Vietnam and were able to identify with 100% accuracy
geographic origins based upon a combination of these markers, leading to a clear distinction
between skins coming from the wild versus those coming from captive breeding facilities.
In contrast to Vietnam, a case study on Malaysia found that wild-capture was the predom-
inant form of gathering pythons in their reptile skin trade (Nossal et al. 2016b). This supports
findings that many reptiles are captured from the wild by rural actors opportunistically
capitalising where sources are high to provide themselves with both primary and secondary
incomes (Kasterine et al. 2012; UNODC 2016). In the case of Malaysia, reduced access to
European markets has made captive-breeding programmes less economically sustainable than
in Vietnam, and wild-capture has emerged as the more profitable method of collection (Nossal
et al. 2016b). Around half of all legally traded python skins are believed to come from wild
sourced animals. The reticulated python earns collectors around $4 per live reptile, an amount
greater than for any other single reptile (UNODC 2016). Those collecting legally with a
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licence earn less per reptile, and so the attraction of illegal gathering is clear. As the first stage
in the trade, the significance of snakes gathered in this way cannot be overlooked. Skins of
unknown origin create difficulties in tracing legality, and whilst the gathering itself may not
necessarily entail corruption (abuse of a position of authority or bribery), the presence of
reptiles, sourced from the wild, creates opportunity for corruption to occur at later stages in the
trade. Legal collection is less profitable than illegal gathering, and so, even though there is
potential for profit from rearing snakes and reptiles, as it stands, there is little economic
viability in the first stage of collection and/or breeding. For quotas to be more effective in
terms of conservation and ensuring livelihoods, there needs to be greater incentives for
compliance and greater deterrence for non-compliance.
Processing and Transportation
In the production of reptile skin products, processing and transportation are closely linked. The
live reptiles must first be slaughtered for their by-products in specific facilities. Generally,
these slaughterhouses are of a relatively small scale, and so to ensure that their businesses
remain economically viable, they may continue to accept live reptiles after surpassing their
quotas in order to maintain a business relationship with their collectors (UNODC 2016). As
previously mentioned, the excess skins produced may be stockpiled and laundered alongside
skins from legally sourced reptiles. There is opportunity for this to occur at the next stage in the
production process—the tanning of reptile skins—which occurs in separate facilities. Restric-
tions on raw skin exports often necessitate the integration of tanneries with registered exporters
(UNODC 2016), as evidenced in Indonesia, where the country’s 14 skin exporters also operate
tanneries (Natusch et al. 2017). The exported processed skins are consequently often later re-
imported to the country of origin because the skins have been manufactured into a variety of
products. As discovered in the case of Malaysia, export restrictions resulted in limited market
access, and so to circumvent bans, skins may first be exported to countries, which are allowed
to sell skins in European markets (Nossal et al. 2016b), and then re-exported from their
destination counties. As shipments provide opportunity for laundering, further exports may
facilitate the introduction of more illegally sourced skins into shipments. For instance,
Malaysia may export processed skins to Singapore, who has access to the European market.
In Singapore, processed skins from several countries and businesses may be combined into a
single shipment that is then exported to Italy. In Italy, the processed skins are made into
handbags and so forth and some are re-exported back to Singapore and Malaysia. Such
complex and frequent shipments create opportunities for (some) legitimate companies to abuse
their positions and engage in corrupt practices alongside their legal business.
The high value and low bulk of reptile skins creates high profit margins and the incentive
for laundering and smuggling of illegal skins by exporters. Illegally gathered skins can be
concealed within shipments of both legal skins and amongst other products. This is facilitated
by the use of documentation falsely declaring skin sizes, or origin of skins, or failing to declare
skins packaged with other products (Kasterine et al. 2012). Although distribution of skins is
monitored through log books (recording quantities amongst other details), false/fraudulent
documentation and concealment allow exporters to export greater quantities of skins than
permitted (Nossal et al. 2016a). Field research in Indonesia found that tanners and exporters
earn the greatest profit from the export of reticulated python skins (UNODC 2016). As
mentioned, in Malaysia, the political interference with the trade has resulted in a higher
proportion of skins from wild-caught reptiles supplying the industry. This results in skins
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being (re)exported multiple times to avoid the restrictions, creating more opportunities for
corruption through bribing of customs and other government officials, laundering and
documenting fraud. Not only is the illegal snake skin trade fuelled by the high profit margins
for the exporters, but also presumably by the economic motivations of other actors in the
supply chain, and facilitated by the poor monitoring and enforcement in regard to exporting
(Kasterine et al. 2012).
Selling and Laundering
As detailed above, by the time reptile skin products have reached the point of sale, various
forms of corruption may have already occurred within the supply chain—the literature,
however, offers little insight on corruption relating to the selling and proceeds. Whilst
corruption significantly facilitates the selling of ivory, there seems to be less corruption at
the same stage in the trade of reptile and snake skins. Presumably, this is a reflection of the
differing nature of the two markets; the ivory market is nearly completely illegal whilst the
majority of reptile and snake skins are destined for use in the luxury fashion market. The
misrepresentation through document fraud or forgery occurring earlier in the trade distances
the fashion industry from the corruption.
Retailers are, however, aware of the potential presence of illegally obtained skins
(UNCTAD 2011). Companies within the fashion industry are taking part of initiatives to
address the transparency of sourcing in their supply chain (Responsible Ecosystems Sourcing
Platform (RESP) 2016) as discussed below. The profits made by the retailers are likely to be
substantially higher than those working in earlier stages of the supply chain, due to the high
markup value of the final product. The literature offers no insight into how these profits are
distributed, but in order to continue supplying the products, retailers must invest some of the
money back into sourcing and processing skins for their final products. In the Vietnamese
python skin trade, 25% of proceeds were used to cover living expenses, or invested back into
farms. A further 36% were used to pay off debts, some of which may have arisen from their
participation in the trade (Nossal et al. 2016a). There is also movement by some companies to
work directly with the suppliers, which not only may be driven by the desire to cut costs by
eliminating the middlemen but may also result in more legally (and ethically) sourced reptiles
and snakes (RESP 2016).
Tagging
Much of the literature makes reference to the proposed tagging systems to combat issues
concerning with reptile sourcing and traceability. Such systems could play a significant role in
reducing illegality and corruption, in terms of reducing fraud and forgery, in the reptile and
snake skin trade. The development of this system was discussed at the 28th meeting of the
CITES Animals Committee (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2015). Var-
ious tagging methods were analysed, including labels and RFID tags which would be applied
to skins directly; marking holes to perforate skins for identification; and a biometric system.
The latter emerged as the most viable due to its applicability, reliability, efficiency and cost of
application. It is based on fingerprinting principles and identifies skins through scale pattern
and design. It can be applied to skins at an early stage in the trade and is advantageous in its
ability to retain sufficient information during the tanning stage, which can negatively impact
other proposed tagging systems (CITES 2015b). A tagging system for the identification of
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crocodilian skins has been successfully implemented in Singapore (CITES Resolution Conf.
11.12), which consists of physical tags attached to skins, and is being used on all imports and
re-exports of skins. The tagging system is supported by random inspections to ensure
compliance (Kasane Conference 2015). Although this works well for crocodilian skins which
can be tagged before processing and maintain the tag, this is not the case for other reptile
species where physical tags may be more difficult to attach permanently, due to differing
compositions of reptile skins. And so, the implementation of tagging systems raises some
practical issues, and some key concerns were highlighted at the aforementioned meeting.
Mexico and Malaysia highlighted the need to decide what should be measured and how this
can be connected with various links in the trade. China cautioned over the use of a universal
system. Despite the practical issues of attempting to implement a global traceability system for
a wider range of reptile skins, it is not infeasible. However, as highlighted by the USA during
the 2015 meeting of the CITES Animals Committee, a more thorough understanding of the
trade is needed before pursuing any specific technologies for use, alongside more clear aims
for the proposed tagging system to address (IISD 2015). RESP (2016) aims to support CITES
in the development and will have a pilot tagging system in place by the end of 2016.
Summary
The literature surrounding the trade in reptile skins is focused mainly on ethics and sustain-
ability; there is little concerned with the issue of corruption specifically. There have been some
specific case studies, and as there are many variations within the trade between locations, it
becomes difficult to create a detailed picture of the situation. What we can see from the
existing literature is that the reptile and snake skin trade, as with the greater wildlife trade, are
susceptible to corruption through document fraud of permits and licences. The abuse of
licences and permits by legitimate businesses in order to exceed annual quotas allows actors
to produce more skins than permitted and gain financially. Such abuses are enabled by the lack
of controls to stop collection. Further document fraud after the collection stage then misrep-
resents the illegally obtained skins as being of legal origin. These findings highlight the need
for further research looking specifically at corruption within the trade to more accurately
determine how document fraud and forgery take place, by whom and what role bribery and
gift-giving may have in the illegal trade. Reptile skin products are generally destined for the
luxury fashion market, which means retailers have a role to play in combating corruption. The
proposed tagging system may be part of this effort as it might prove effective in reducing fraud
and forgery and thus laundering. The lack of accountability for actors involved in the trade
allows them to turn a blind eye to illegality and engage in corrupt activity by abusing the
position of their legitimate business for economic gain. In addition to a tagging system, greater
accountability is needed at all stages in the supply chain.
Live Reptile Trade
Using the model presented throughout this paper, this section aims to highlight the modes of
corruption that occur at each stage during the trading of live reptiles. As an overview, since the
1990s, this type of trade has increased enormously both illegally and legally. According to
Hoover (1998: 2), upon review of the wildlife trade literature, and numerous press releases
from B1970 to 1990 there were only 11 reported investigations of international live reptile
smuggling, while from 1991 to 1997 there were at least 23 such cases reported^. Unfortunately,
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the consequences do not outweigh the benefits for smugglers due to the high monetary
incentives attached to smuggling wildlife, such as endangered reptiles (Nurse 2015; Wyatt
2013b).
Auliya et al. (2016: 104) state that Bof the 10,272 currently recognised reptile species, the
trade of fewer than eight per cent are regulated by the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the European Wildlife Trade
Regulations (EWTR)^. Live reptiles are in demand for the international pet trade (Zaldívar
Riverón et al. 2002; IUCN 2013), and species wanted as pets may well fall outside of the 8%
that are being internationally monitored. This may mean corruption is unnecessary, as much of
the trade is legal and therefore not strictly controlled.
Breeding
The above-mentioned increase in the illegal live reptile trade did not lead to more research,
which means that there is a limited understanding of where and how corruption features along
this wildlife trafficking chain. Most suspicion of illegality focuses on the capture or breeding
stage at the beginning of the process (Lyons and Natusch 2011; CITES Secretariat 2015).
Evidence of misdeclarations related to breeding in captivity have been found. In some cases,
the species marked as captive bred are a species that have not been successfully bred in
captivity and in other cases the rate of breeding was not possible for the species (TRAFFIC
2012; CITES Standing Committee 2014). One study shows that due to the high demand for
exotic reptiles as pets, approximately 76% of green pythons traded in Indonesia have been sold
and exported to breeding farms illegally with the eggs being kept to breed more (Lyons and
Natusch 2011). Such intensive harvesting is threatening the species to which Tensen (2016:
293) argues Bwildlife farming can only be sustainable^ if corruption is not present at any of the
trade stages.
In many places when breeding protected species, there is a captive breeding register
(Zaldívar Riverón et al. 2002). Again, this may be a point for corruption to occur. Hoover
(1998) suggests that breeding farms should be monitored more closely to track their legitima-
cy. In 2016, CITES members adopted a resolution to address monitoring captive breeding
facilities and ranches as these can be sources of fraudulent claims of the species origins
(CITES 2016a). For instance, as Nijman and Shepherd (2009) found on their study of captive
breeding facilities that species sold in the markets as captive bred could not be located at
captive breeding facilities. This reiterates that corruption and lack of enforcement of regional
wildlife regulations facilitate the laundering of poached wildlife (Phelps et al. 2013).
Transportation
There is little evidence to illustrate how corruption features in the transportation stage of the
illegal live reptile trade. However, corruption, in the form of false/fraudulent or forged
documentation, plays a role in laundering of wild caught species as captive bred in order for
the reptiles to be transported without further scrutiny. For example, Auliya et al. (2016: 107)
found that one Bmethod of evading CITES regulations^ was to camouflage illegally wild
caught reptiles Bwith fraudulent labelling indicating that they have been captive bred^ to allow
for smooth transportation. Further to that, a study, done by the European Parliament (2016) on
the EU trade policy and the wildlife trade, found that coastal routes were also used to smuggle
North African reptiles—for the domestic pet industry—into the EU. As outlined above
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regarding the illegal ivory trade, this route is susceptible to corrupt practices. However, as
noted previously the corrupt practice—in this case, fraudulent documentation—may have
taken place at capture/breeding stage rather than at the transportation stage.
Smugglers have been known to use different methods for trafficking live reptiles, such as
using fraudulent packaging descriptions when sending through a courier service and bringing
live reptiles in through airports, on their person or in their luggage. There are instances of legal
shipments of live reptiles having protected illegal species mixed in with the cargo (Wyatt 2013a).
We suggest that using a legal transaction to perpetrate an illegal transaction is an abuse of the
employee’s or business owner’s position and can therefore be considered as a corrupt practice.
Corruption may also occur if an inspector during the shipping of the reptiles were to notice and
potentially be bribed to allow the shipment to continue unhindered. For example, Vietnamwhich
has been known to be a transit country for reptiles has experienced widespread corruption with
corrupt officials accepting bribes or payments for services provided (Wyatt and Cao 2015).
Also noteworthy is that since much of the live trade is legal with different countries having
different regulations regarding the shipment of reptiles, a potentially complicated and at times
ambiguous regime of permits and licences exists, which further complicates the policing of the
illegal transportation. The acceptance of fraudulent export permits means that the import of the
illegal reptile is then Blegalised^. Also, if the illegal reptiles are laundered during the breeding
or capture stage, they are viewed as legal when being exported. This may mean that corruption
is mostly unnecessary in these later stages since the reptiles are now legal commodities.
TRAFFIC (2016) found evidence that the numbers of traded reptiles reported are inconsistent.
For example, between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the reported number of exports from
Indonesia did not match the reported number of imports to the Netherlands: BA survey of the
annual Snake trade expo in Houten revealed 301 unlisted Indonesian reptiles for sale by
stallholders from eight European countries^.
Selling
In addition to sales at expos, illegal breeders can be found advertising online and inside
magazines. On some occasions, sellers have been known to illegally sell live reptiles under the
guise of legal pet shops and reptile fairs (Christy 2008). As with the smuggling of illegal
reptiles within legal shipments described above, abusing a legitimate business to traffic
wildlife at the fairs could be considered a corrupt practice. This raises the question as to
how legal trade can be better controlled. It is not clear who the actors are in terms of the online
companies, magazines, pet shop owners and/or the breeders. In the case of online trade, the
likelihood is that the illegal online sales are facilitated by volume of sales and difficulty in
policing the Internet rather than corruption. This is thought to be the case because there have
been a number of agreements signed between the ASA (Advertising Standards Authority) and
online platforms to not advertise illegal wildlife. Despite this, in 2015, the Guardian Environ-
ment Network reported that the illegal trading of wildlife was still taking place on eBay even
though a number of controls had been put in place (Williams 2015).
Summary
To conclude, there appears to be a lack of consistency in monitoring and adhering to guidelines
at each stage of live reptile trading, from the beginning with the issuing of permits to reputable
breeders through to transportation. Furthermore, there appears to be little oversight at the end
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stage where proceeds are collected and distributed. With the existence of a large legal pet
industry, it appears that some businesses engage in corrupt practices by abusing their legitimate
status to also traffic reptiles through fraudulent paperwork and/or smuggling. The conse-
quences for this type of crime do not outweigh the benefits, therefore making it easy and
profitable for illegal traders to repeatedly offend. The notable lack of academic and general
literature on this issue highlights that there is little concrete detail about corruption in this
particular wildlife trade.
Discussion and Conclusion
Whereas it is largely accepted that corruption is one of the main facilitators of wildlife
trafficking, on closer examination, at least of these three cases, very little of the specific
mechanisms of corruption have been uncovered. From what is known, within the three cases,
notable differences in terms of the trafficking process and the corruption used to facilitate that
process are evident (see Table 3). In points along the process where there are permits, the permits
are a place for corruption to occur. The corruption taking place consists of breeders/poachers and
exporters misdeclaring wild caught versus captive bred, the number of or species being born or
transported, or the country of origin. We argue this is corruption rather than simply crime as
these acts are only possible because of the abuse of a legitimate position held by the perpetrators.
As Williams et al. (2016) propose, this is an entry-point for intervention mechanisms to combat
both corruption and wildlife trafficking. Additionally, bribery features along all the trafficking
chains as seen in Table 3 to enable smuggling and/or the permit abuse. Patronage may well be
present too but it is an under-researched topic in both wildlife trafficking and corruption.
Diplomatic cover was only found to play a role in the trafficking of ivory. What Table 3 also
makes clear is that very little is known specifically about the planning and laundering stages.
Presumably, points along the chain are targeted for corrupt acts (a specific person to be bribed/
permit to be used fraudulently), but this level of detail is unknown. Furthermore, clearly the
proceeds of this profitable and prevalent blackmarket are filtering into the legitimate market, but
again, very little is known about how this is taking place though attempts are being made to
understand the flow of illicit finances (see Maguire and Haenlein 2015).
Planning and laundering in particular are impacted by the societal structures—the criminal
justice system and the economic and political environments—featured in Table 2. When the
rule of law, political economy and societal/cultural attitudes fail to value or recognise wildlife
and do not recognise that wildlife crime is a serious crime, wildlife trafficking and other
wildlife crimes continue largely unchallenged. The same can be said of corruption. As Table 2
illustrates, the trafficking process (Table 3) sits within the potentially corrupted structures that
facilitate wildlife trafficking and other crimes. Context-specific and evidence-based prevention
strategies are needed to address both the macro- and micro-level corruption (see Williams et al.
2016 for a discussion).
A necessary and important step that must take place to gain this context specificity and
evidence base is for further investigations to be undertaken in Asia and beyond into the diverse
range of wildlife trafficking and the corruption involved. Even though a limited overview was
able to be given here, what is clear is that these three cases are each unique in how they are
structured and how corruption, known or suspected, features are also unique. The uniqueness may
stem from the differences in the wildlife and the associated market, but differences, and thus
different solutions, will likely also be country specific and also depend upon where in the chain of
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trafficking the corruption takes place. This supports that a one-size-fits-all approach to tackling
either and both wildlife trafficking and corruption is unlikely to be effective, and individual case-
dependent solutions must be developed if the wildlifes targeted by trafficking are to be saved.
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